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AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON ZIVOTOFSKY V. KERRY 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND DIALOGIC CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Catherine Powell* 
When the Supreme Court held that the executive branch has exclusive authority to recognize foreign sover-
eigns in the Jerusalem passport case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),1 Jack Goldsmith hailed the decision as a 
“vindication” of  presidential signing statements and executive power.2 Indeed, in the context of  the debate 
over the treatment of  the terror suspects, the New York Times had called such signing statements the “consti-
tutionally ludicrous” work of  an overreaching, “imperial presidency.”3 
Others in this Symposium4 and elsewhere have covered what a “bonanza”5 Zivotofsky II is for foreign relations 
law, the competing visions6 of  foreign relations at the case’s center, the justices’ reliance on historical practice7 
in constitutional interpretation, and the ways in which the opinion departs from8 or reinforces9 the Roberts 
Court trend toward “normalizing”10 foreign relations law.   
Building on these themes, the focus of  this essay is on how Zivotofsky II demonstrates the role that presidential 
signing statements can play in facilitating inter-branch dialogue,11 as a means of  promoting clarity, cooperation, 
and compromise in constitutional interpretation.12 Notwithstanding my earlier criticism of  specific signing 
statements in the context of  the treatment of  terror suspects13—a position I maintain today based on my 
disagreement with the substance of  those statements—I am not against signing statements per se.   
In fact, I agree with Goldsmith that “[s]igning statements are not in themselves cause for concern . . . . Poor 
interpretations of  Article II articulated in a signing statement can be a cause for concern—especially in the rare 
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signing statement that leads to non-compliance.”14 Criticism of  signing statements are often really debates about 
the proper reach of  presidential power. Zivotofsky II provides an opportunity to assess the value of  signing 
statements in a different light and to build on my earlier work on dialogic approaches to the Constitution.15       
I. Who is in Dialogue, with Whom, and on What Terms? 
The signing statement implicated in Zivotofsky II is one President George W. Bush issued when he signed into 
law the statute at question—the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003.16 Most presidential 
signing statements perform an expressive function, and the one at issue in Zivotofsky II articulated the executive 
branch’s long-held position of  neutrality in the dispute between the Israelis and Palestinians regarding sover-
eignty over Jerusalem. While American presidents have maintained a consistent policy of  formal recognition 
of  Israel since President Truman in 1948, neither Truman nor any subsequent U.S. president has recognized 
any country’s sovereignty over Jerusalem specifically—insisting instead that the matter be addressed through 
negotiations.  
By contrast, the U.S. Congress has expressed its support for Israeli sovereignty over the city. In 2002, Con-
gress adopted the appropriations bill at issue in Zivotofsky II, Section 214(d) of  which provides that, “[f]or 
purposes of  the registration of  birth, certification of  nationality, or issuance of  a passport of  a United States 
citizen born in the city of  Jerusalem, the Secretary [of  State] shall, upon the request of  the citizen or the citizen’s 
legal guardian, record the place of  birth as Israel.”17 In placing this provision in a section of  the statute with 
the heading “United States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of  Israel,” Congress’s intended signal 
on the question of  recognition was unmistakable. 
In signing the Act into law, President George W. Bush issued a signing statement, indicating his view that “if  
construed as mandatory rather than advisory, [section 214(d) would] impermissibly interfere with the President’s 
constitutional authority to formulate the position of  the United States, speak for the Nation in international 
affairs, and determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign states.”18 President Bush underscored 
that “U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem has not changed.”19 
In issuing the signing statement, President Bush opened up a dialogue on several fronts with regard to who 
has constitutional authority to make particular types of  diplomatic statements and who has authority to determine 
the content of  such communications. While President Obama maintained Bush’s position on neutrality over Je-
rusalem—and thus there was consensus on this point across party and across administrations, dialogic 
constitutionalism involves the President and Congress developing an intra-branch consensus in interpreting a 
particular constitutional principle, which the Court later adopts. In Zivotofsky II, the Court stepped in to ulti-
mately resolve the disagreement. Nonetheless, we can examine Zivotofsky II for its potential as a case of  dialogic 
constitutionalism, even though it ultimately falls short.  
The model of  dialogue Zivotofsky II presents runs both horizontally and vertically. Along the horizontal axis, 
the President and Congress are in dialogue with each other—and ultimately the courts—over the boundaries 
 
14 Goldsmith, supra note 2. 
15 Powell, supra note 11. While not personally invested in the outcome of  the case, by coincidence, my son was born in Jerusalem in 
March 2003, shortly after the statute at issue went into effect and Zivotofsky’s parent sought to have “Israel” put on their son’s U.S. 
passport. We lived in Jerusalem that year because my son’s father was the chief  of  staff  to the UN Special Envoy to the Middle East 
Peace Process at the time. 
16 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002). 
17 Id. (emphasis added).  
18 Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1698 (Sep. 30, 2002). 
19 Id. 
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of  their respective authority over diplomatic communications. As in many debates over constitutional interpre-
tation, the disagreement between the President and Congress (and ultimately between the majority and dissent) 
can be framed as a dispute over the level of  generality or specificity for defining the scope of  the constitutional 
authority. While Justice Kennedy resolves the case on the narrow issue of  who has authority to recognize 
foreign sovereigns, in dissent, Chief  Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia frame the issue more broadly on the 
President’s powers, respectively, to engage in foreign relations and in a range of  foreign affairs-related activities, 
such as naturalization. With the signing statement, the President, in effect, warned Congress that it has over-
stepped its bounds and declined to enforce section 214(d). 
Along the vertical axis, the President and Congress are speaking to the People, who can elevate representa-
tives up into high office, but just as easily vote them down if  they do not agree with them. Beyond the ordinary 
public in the United States, the President and Congress were also speaking to the various publics abroad, both 
“up” to the United Nations and international community more broadly and “across” to the various parties and 
constituencies in the Middle East. The courts and these various publics are able to use both Congressional and 
Presidential statements as inputs in making determinations about who wins the constitutional battles at stake.  
The fact that the signing statement had an expressive function aimed at the Israeli and Palestinian factions 
in the Middle East—and the fact that the Supreme Court recognized this expressive function—is apparent 
from the way Kennedy discusses it. In holding that section 214(d) unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s 
exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion discusses how the signing 
statement was part and parcel of  the executive branch’s efforts to send a signal to the parties in the region that 
U.S. policy toward Jerusalem had, in fact, not changed.20 The President’s view of  his exclusive authority to 
recognize foreign sovereign authority over Jerusalem—as is illustrated in the signing statement—is nicely 
aligned with Kennedy’s analysis of  constitutional text, structure, precedent, and historical practice. While Ken-
nedy does not appear to give the signing statement much independent weight in his ultimate conclusion, the 
discussion of  the signing statement over three paragraphs in the majority opinion suggests that the statement 
provided information to the Court about the President’s view as well as evidence of  the strength and persistence 
of  the President’s position. 
The expressive work the signing statement performs is in laying down a marker—even before the emergence 
of  litigation—that the executive branch would continue its policy of  neutrality on Jerusalem as a matter of  
foreign policy. Maintaining neutrality on Jerusalem has helped the United States project an image as an honest 
broker in peace negotiation.21 This was important in the context of  the Middle East peace process in 2002 and 
2003, particularly in the context of  a war against Iraq that, at least in 2003, was popular with the Israeli govern-
ment but not among many Arabs. A variety of  foreign policy considerations (related to both the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as well as the region) were at play. In holding that the executive branch has exclusive power 
over recognition of  foreign sovereigns, Justice Kennedy’s functionalist approach prioritized the value of  having 
the President as the single decision-maker in balancing such delicate foreign policy concerns.   
While President Bush might have considered other vehicles for expressing his view on Jerusalem, these other 
options seemed less desirable. A press release would have carried less weight; an executive order would have 
only applied to the executive branch; and an executive memorandum would have had even less legal weight 
 
20 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2082 (noting that when Palestinian leaders protested this new U.S. statute—despite the signing state-
ment—the Secretary of  State was forced to respond by “advis[ing] diplomats to express their understanding of  ‘Jerusalem’s importance 
to both sides and to many others around the world.’” Id. (internal citation omitted)).  
21 The status of  Jerusalem is one of  the most difficult issues to resolve in Israeli-Palestinian conflict and diplomats involved in the 
peace negotiations have therefore preserved it as a final status issue to be resolved as part of  a comprehensive peace plan.   
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than a signing statement.22 Bush also could have vetoed this Authorization Act,23 but by issuing a signing state-
ment instead, he was able to reap the benefits of  other aspects of  legislation that he liked, while sending signals 
on the status of  Jerusalem and his own authority over recognition.  
II. Dialogic Approach to Constitutional Interpretation in Foreign Affairs 
In Zivotofsky II, the Court stepped in to resolve the conflict. But in other conflicts—signaled by presidential 
signing statements—the political branches and public have engaged in forms of  dialogic constitutionalism to 
mediate and eventually come to consensus, followed by the Court adopting the constitutional principle. As I 
have elaborated more fully elsewhere,24 President Bush’s signing statement on the McCain Amendment (con-
cerning humane treatment of  terror suspects detained abroad) was the subject of  tremendous controversy and 
debate. In response to criticism of  this signing statement and other assertions of  executive power concerning 
detainees, the Bush Administration eventually conceded that it would apply the Geneva Convention standards 
of  humane treatment to, for example, Guantanamo, as a matter of  policy, though not as matter of  law. The 
iterative process that followed among Congress, the executive branch, and courts represented a dialogic process 
that, at least with respect to the use of  enhanced interrogation techniques, was resolved with the election of  
President Obama and his Executive Orders on point. 
While presidential signing statements can be used in problematic ways to assert controversial substantive 
positions, they can promote dialogue with coordinate branches as well as a degree of  executive branch trans-
parency, unlike—for example—the Office of  Legal Counsel memos prepared during the presidency of  George 
W. Bush, which were not regularly made public. Elsewhere, I have discussed the value of  dialogic approaches 
to constitutional interpretation in the context of  cooperative federalism.25 In this essay, I extend that analysis 
to the way presidential signing statements shape and influence the struggle for constitutional meaning among 
the President, Congress, and the federal courts.  
Curtis Bradley and Eric Posner point out that presidential signing statements emerged around two hundred 
years ago and have been routinely used from the New Deal onward.26 Signing statements have played a variety 
of  expressive roles: to explain or praise a bill; to illuminate how executive branch officials will implement the 
bill; to assert a particular interpretation of  a specific provision of  a bill; to describe how the bill will interact 
with other statutes; to criticize Congress on policy grounds; and to criticize, question, or clarify Congressional 
action on constitutional grounds (including where presidential power is implicated) as in Zivotofsky II.27 
In fact, presidents have claimed authority to disregard statutes that they argued were unconstitutional at least 
as far back as Jefferson, who decided not to continue prosecutions under the Sedition Act because of  his 
concerns that this infringed on the First Amendment.28 Across party lines, several administrations have taken 
the position that the president may decline enforcement of  statutes believed to be unconstitutional.29 
 
22 Cf., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
23 In fact, Bush did not exercise the veto power for his first five and a half  years in office, and yet he issued more signing statements 
based on constitutional objections than any other president. Jamie E. Kay, Eight Years, Twelve Vetoes: Why President Bush Chose to Ignore his 
Veto Power, 2 STUDENT PULSE, No. 05, 2010. See also Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of  Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006.     
24 Powell, supra note 13. 
25 Cf., Powell, supra note 11. 
26 Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 335. 
29 Id. at 336 (citing, among others, the well-known Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of  Legal 
Counsel, to the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President para. 3 (Nov. 2, 1994)). 
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In envisioning a model of  dialogue that runs both horizontally and vertically, Zivotofsky II fits most closely—
though ultimately not perfectly—within the standard political science model of  dialogic constitutionalism.30 
On this view, dialogue among the three branches of  the federal government occurs over a fairly long period, 
until the Supreme Court is eventually “brought into line with the constitutional views held by a political coalition 
that sustains itself  in power for a suitably long period[,]” such that, through the appointments process, new 
justices whose views mirror the views of  the political coalition are elevated to the Supreme Court.31 In Zivotofsky 
II, there was ultimately no political consensus between the executive and legislative branches (though, as men-
tioned above, there was consensus across party-lines and across administrations within the White House, with 
both Presidents Bush and Obama maintaining the same position on Jerusalem’s neutrality).   
The model of  dialogue at work in Zivotofsky II is also different from the account of  dialogic constitutionalism 
emphasized by social movement theorists, such as Robert Post and Reva Siegel (who envision constitutional 
law shaped more directly by the People, who organize “social movements that offer distinctive constitutional 
visions”).32 Zivotofsky II also does not quite fit the dialogic model implied by Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional 
moments, in which the courts face “a mobilized public, and its political leadership [and thus] abandon their 
previous interpretation of  the Constitution and adopt the one offered by their conversational partners” through 
an interaction producing a “switch in time.”33   
Finally, as a descriptive matter, the outcome in Zivotofsky II—and the dialogic model sketched here to explain 
the outcome—is dissimilar from popular constitutionalism. “In popular constitutionalism, everyone—the mo-
bilized people, their political representatives, and the courts—offers up constitutional interpretations all at 
once,” but unlike the dialogic approaches just discussed, “the courts have no normative priority in the conver-
sation.”34 Putting Zivotofsky I and II together, the Court did have priority and the final say, in reaching and deciding 
the merits (in contrast to the popular constitutionalism approach). 
Even so, Peter Spiro is right to note that the Court is not the only relevant branch engaged in interpreting 
the scope and division of  authority in foreign affairs under the Constitution.35 Presidential signing statements 
are one channel through which the executive branch can promote its understanding of  presidential foreign 
affairs (and other constitutional) authority. And as Jean Galbraith reminds us, Edward Corwin described the 
Constitution as “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of  directing American foreign policy[.]”36 Yet, Zivo-
tofsky stands for the proposition that the Court has supremacy over constitutional interpretation, and that this 
supremacy—common in the domestic affairs realm—extends to (at least some) matters of  interpretation in 
foreign affairs. 
Of  course, a presidential signing statement that asserts a particular constitutional interpretation may outline 
a view at odds with Congress’s view or merely clarify a potentially shared view. The “substantive uncertainty 
 
30 The approaches to dialogic constitutionalism outlined here are drawn from Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991 (2006). The political science view originated with Robert Dahl and was updated by Barry Friedman. See, e.g., 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Barry Friedman, 
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). 
31 Tushnet, supra note 30, at 998 (citing Dahl and Friedman). 
32 Id. (citing Post and Siegel and describing how these social movements “offer constitutional visions, typically oppositional to the 
vision dominant in the courts [and perhaps other branches] when the movements begin[,]” but who overtime influence the Court, 
though not through the standard political process and appointments process). 
33 Id. at 999 (citing Ackerman and explaining that “[u]nlike the social movements model, here the mechanism of  change is not 
persuasion but submission”). 
34 Id. at 999. See also Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution Outside of  the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 437 (1992). 
35 Spiro, supra note 9.  
36 Galbraith, supra note 8. (citing EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (1940)). 
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concerning where the boundary between Congress and the President lies . . . may spur cooperation, compro-
mise, and reflection, as well as allow[] for shifting resolutions that fit shifting times.”37 In fact, the tripartite 
framework Justice Jackson outlines in his well-known concurring opinion in Youngstown envisions concurrent, 
shared authority in some areas.  
On the one hand, the Youngstown framework is quite malleable as applied—for example—to the Zivotofsky II 
case itself  (where the executive branch wins under Justice Jackson’s Youngstown category 3 analysis, even 
though the President’s authority is at his lowest ebb, where his action directly contradict the will of  Congress). 
On the other hand, the Youngstown framework reminds us that the Constitution does not “partake of  the pro-
lixity of  a legal code,” and that “only its great outlines [are] marked, its important objects designated, and the 
minor ingredients which compose those objects [left to] be deduced from the nature of  the objects them-
selves.”38 Presidential signing statements can offer one view, among several, that can help guide the process of  
constitutional interpretation. 
Conclusion 
While the signing statement for the statute at issue in Zivotofsky II was not decisive in the Court’s holding, it 
illustrates how the executive branch can use such statements as tools to promote U.S. foreign policies objective 
abroad and to advance its views of  the Constitution at home. Signing statements can promote transparency, 
dialogue, and provide a window into the executive branch’s view of  the Constitution outside the context of  
litigation. 
As Goldsmith notes, “[t]he vast majority of  signing statements that contain constitutional objections (or 
potential constitutional objections) to a statute are never operationalized with actual non-compliance on the 
ground.”39 The signing statement in the Jerusalem passports case was “a rare creature,” 40 in that President 
Bush—and subsequently President Obama—did, in fact, disregard a law the White House believed to be un-
constitutional. In Zivotofsky II, the Court held that this was the correct constitutional position for both presidents 
to take. In disregarding an unconstitutional law—and in issuing a signing statement to signal its unconstitution-
ality—Presidents Bush and Obama advanced our understanding and appreciation of  the Constitution, as part 
of  an ongoing dialogue on the proper role of  each branch in the U.S. foreign policy project. 
 
 
37 Id.  
38 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
39 Goldsmith, supra note 2. 
40 Id.  
